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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WESLEY JOHN HARLAN, : 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
vs. : 
BONNIE KATHLEEN HARLAN, 
Respondent/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CASE NO. 990011 - CA 
: PRIORITY NO. 15 
Appellant, BONNIE HARLAN, hereinafter "Ms. Harlan" or 
"Wife", submits the following Brief: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
Rules 3 and 4 of the UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE and §78-
2a-3(2)(h) UTAH CODE ANN. (1998). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
denying Wife's pro se Motion for Relief from Judgment or 
Order? 
This Court will reverse a trial court's ruling on a motion 
under Rule 60(b) where there has been an abuse of discretion. 
Udv v. Udy. 893 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah App. 1995) (citing Larsen 
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v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984). "A liberal standard for 
application of Rule 60(b) in divorce cases is justified by the 
doctrine of continuing jurisdiction that a divorce court has over 
its decrees. Clearly, a court should modify a prior decree when 
the interest of equity and fair dealing with the court and the 
opposing party so require/' Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928, 931 
(Utah 1980). In addition, "[d]iscretion must be exercised in 
furtherance of justice and the court will incline toward granting 
relief in a doubtful case to the end that the party may have a 
hearing." Id. (quoting Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741, 
742 (Utah 1953) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Wife submits that there are no statutory nor 
constitutional provisions completely determinative of the 
issues presented herein. However Rule 60 of *the UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE is relevant to this appeal and is attached 
hereto as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Eighth 
Judicial District Court, in and for Duchesne County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable John R. Anderson presiding. 
2 
The trial court entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce on August 19, 
1998. (R. 153 and 160, Addendum B and C). Wife, pro se, 
filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order on November 
10, 1998. (R. 213, Addendum D). The trial court denied 
Wife's motion on December 28, 1998. (R. 228, Addendum E). 
Wife filed her Notice of Appeal of this order on January 4, 
1999. (R. 240) . 
B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties to this action were husband and wife, 
having been married on September 11, 1962. (R. 153). 
During the marriage, the parties purchased a mobile home on 
an 80-acre farm on the Myton Bench. (R. 112). At the time 
of the divorce, the home and real property was owned free 
and clear of all liens. (R. 112). The parties stipulated 
to a fair market value of this home of $157,000. (R. 112). 
The parties also accrued numerous pieces of farm 
equipment, a piano, a camp trailer, as well as an interest 
in a time-shared condo in Park City. (R. Ill). The parties 
also accrued interests in their respective IRA accounts. 
Specifically, the Wife had accrued $524.00, and the Husband 
had accrued $14,700.00. (R. 111). In addition, during the 
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marriage, the parties accrued an interest in a limited 
liability company known as John Harlan Excavation. (R. 
111). Husband filed a complaint for divorce on August 19, 
1997. (R. 6). This matter went to trial on May 28, 1998, 
and the trial court took the matter under advisement. (R. 
154). The lower court entered a ruling on June 16, 1998. 
(R. 112, Addendum F). With regard to the value of the 
limited liability company, the trial court stated that: 
The Court, based upon a totality of the evidence, 
from an examination of the exhibits adduced and 
from the record determines that the value of the 
business is $195,735 and makes the following 
findings to support that conclusion: 
1. The equipment as per the appraisal which 
was set forth in Petitioner's Exhibit Two (2) 
showed a reasonable value of the equipment and 
machinery at $234,100. The parties stipulated to 
the introduction of the exhibit and it appears to 
be reasonable. There is testimony that a welder 
that was part of the equipment had a value of 
$2,200 which was not included in that appraisal. 
The Court has also, from reviewing the photographs 
of the equipment and having an analysis of the 
financial statement which is tendered and received 
into evidence as Exhibit Six (6), has determined 
there should be additional values for supplies and 
parts of $2,000 and additional tools and inventory 
of gravel in the amount of $2,000. Added to that 
should be accounts receivable of $9,000 and the 
cash at the time of trial of $3,000. Deduct liens 
payable to Zion's First National Bank of $55,565 
without the addition of any value that would be 
attached to the business for good will as per 
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992), 
the company has a value of $195,735 and the 
Petitioner has in his possession a camp trailer 
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with a value of $2,000. Assets were reviewed in 
order to provide a fairly equal distribution as 
follows: 
2. The equipment, machinery, tools, 
inventory and assets of the business, including 
the camp trailer with a value of $2,000, will be 
retained by the Petitioner; having a total value 
of $197,735. 
ASSET EQUALIZATION 
3. The valuation of the real estate, farm 
equipment, four-wheel drive all-terrain vehicle, 
piano and time share, total $176,000, will be 
awarded to the Respondent. 
4. The net difference in the IRA Accounts, 
$14,176 plus $5,000 which is the value of a 
reasonable automobile, are awarded to the 
Respondent in addition. (R. 110-111)(emphasis 
added). 
Therefore, according to the lower court's Ruling, the lower 
court awarded Husband $195,735 of the marital estate and 
Wife $195,1761, very close to an equal distribution. The 
lower court directed Mr. Hunt, counsel for Wife, to prepare 
the appropriate findings and decree based on this ruling. 
(R. 107). 
Wife submitted the requested documents on July 29, 
1998. (R. 117). The proposed findings and decree, in 
relevant part awarded Husband $197,735 (in the form of the 
business and camp trailer) and the Wife the marital 
residence and property ($176,000) and the sum of $19,176 for 
1
 $176,000 + $14,176 + $5,000 = $195,176 
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the differential in Husband's IRA account and the $5,000 for 
a reasonable automobile, and her premarital property. (R. 
180-181). This is the exact division set forth in the lower 
court's Ruling. 
On July 31, 1998, Husband filed his objections to the 
proposed findings and decree because he did not agree with 
the trial court's valuation of the business and because he 
would rather do a tax free IRA transfer, rather than pay the 
IRA differential in cash. (R. 120-122). On August 18, 
1998, Husband requested a ruling from the trial court on his 
objections to Wife's proposed findings and decree. (R. 
143). One day later, on August 19, 1998, the court entered 
the Findings of fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce which were submitted by Husband on or about July 28, 
1998. (R. 166). At this time, the parties had also both 
moved for an order to show cause in which the parties raised 
issues concerning medical costs, timeshare maintenance 
costs, the payment of the automobile costs and attorney's 
fees award made to the Wife in the decree, and various other 
claims. (R. 178). The parties reached a stipulation which 
was entered on the record and included in the Order 
resolving these issues. (R. 178, Addendum G) . Neither 
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party raised issues concerning the changes from the ruling 
to the findings and decree submitted by the Husband in the 
respective order to show causes and these issues were 
neither discussed nor stipulated to at any time. (R. 178, a 
transcript of this hearing can be found at R. 320 as well, 
Minute Entry, R. 175). 
On October 16, 1998, counsel for Wife entered his 
withdrawal. (R. 181). Wife, pro se, filed a "Motion for 
Relief from Judgment or Order" on November 10, 1998. (R. 
213). In this motion, Wife clearly pointed out the changes 
from what the trial court stated in its ruling to what 
Husband submitted as his proposed findings and decree which 
the court eventually signed. (R. 212). Wife sought relief 
from the "inconsistent declarations of judgment" with 
regards to the valuation of the business and the payment of 
the $19,176 for the difference in the IRAs and for the 
purchase of a reasonable car. (R. 212) . 
Husband responded to this motion with his "Memorandum 
in Opposition to Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order" 
on November 27, 1998. (R. 220, Addendum H). In this 
memorandum, Husband argued that Wife's motion should be 
denied because: (1) she did not set forth specific grounds 
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for Rule 60 relief; (2) the issues raised in the motion were 
already considered by the trial court; (3) the parties 
entered a stipulation resolving the issues raised at the 
Order to Show Cause hearing; and (4) the trial court's 
decision was accurate and should not be set aside. (R. 216 
- 220). Wife then filed a reply, pro se, to this memorandum 
on December 3, 1998. (R. 226, Addendum I). 
The trial court entered a Ruling on Wife's Rule 60 
motion on December 10, 1998. (R. 228, Addendum J). The 
trial court denied the motion ''for the reasons set forth in 
Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition/' and specifically 
because the "Court finds no compelling reason to set aside 
the decree." (R. 228). This Order was entered on December 
28, 1998. (R. 234). 
Wife filed her Notice of Appeal of this Order on 
January 4, 1999. (R. 240). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion by denying Wife's 
pro se motion for relief from judgment or order. The 
discrepancies from the trial court's order to the decree 
entered by the court can only be explained by mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. The Ruling 
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from the trial court was stated in clear language and 
supported by the court's findings. Husband did not file any 
objection to this Ruling. A hearing was not held to 
determine why the trial court should modify its Ruling. 
However, while Wife submitted findings and a decree, 
pursuant to the court's direction, which mirrored the 
court's Ruling, the court signed the findings and decree 
submitted by Husband, even though Husband's findings and 
decree modified the trial court's Ruling to the substantial 
prejudice of Wife. 
Rule 60(b) allows for a judgment or decree to be set 
aside for the aforementioned reasons, or where the interests 
of equity, fairness and justice so require. The trial court 
should have granted Wife's motion for relief from judgment 
or granted a hearing to determine the issues raised therein. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING WIFE'S PRO 
SE MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER. 
"[T]he court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons . . . mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect . . .or for any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
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judgment." UTAH R. Civ. PRO. 60(b). The trial court is granted 
broad discretion on ruling on a motion for relief from judgment 
under Rule 60(b). See Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 
1989); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986); Russell v. 
Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1984). However, the trial 
court, in exercising its discretion, must consider all of the 
relevant factors in granting or denying a motion under Rule 
60(b). 
The allowance of a vacation of judgment is a creature 
of equity designed to relieve against harshness of 
enforcing a judgment, which may occur through 
procedural difficulties, the wrongs of the opposing 
party, or misfortunes which prevent the presentation of 
a claim or defense. Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure outlines the situations wherein a party 
may be relieved from a final judgment, among which is 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect 
claimed here by appellant. Equity considers factors 
which may be irrelevant in actions at law, such as 
unfairness of a party's conduct, his delay in bringing 
or continuing the action, the hardship in granting or 
denying relief. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 
741, 742 (Utah 1953) . 
The trial court is granted a very liberal standard for 
granting relief under Rule 60(b) in regards to divorce cases. 
See Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980). "A liberal 
standard for application of Rule 60(b) in divorce cases is 
justified by the doctrine of continuing jurisdiction that a 
divorce court has over its decrees. Clearly, a court should 
modify a prior decree when the interest of equity and fair 
dealing with the court and the opposing party so require/' Id. 
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at 931. In addition, "[d]iscretion must be exercised in 
furtherance of justice and the court will incline toward granting 
relief in a doubtful case to the end that the party may have a 
hearing/' Id. (quoting Warren, 260 P.2d at 743 (citation 
omitted). 
In Boyce, the wife moved to set aside a decree of divorce 
based on the allegations that she had obtained material and 
relevant information regarding the property in the marital 
estate, husband was guilty of fraud, misrepresentation or 
misconduct during the divorce proceeding, and that the 
stipulation was entered under duress. Id. at 929. The trial 
court ruled that the wife had failed to state any grounds for 
which the decree could be set aside under Rule 60(b). Id. at 
930. Wife then moved the trial court to modify the decree and to 
allow further discovery. Id. These motions were denied as well. 
Wife then appealed the trial court's denial of her motion to 
set aside the judgment. Id. Wife alleged that husband had 
committed fraud on the court and on her in representing his net 
worth as $200,000 in April of 1978. Id. To support the 
allegations of fraud, Wife relied on husband's loan application 
filed in May of 1978 where he claimed his net worth was 
$1,154,690.10. Id. The final findings and decree were entered 
on June 22, 1978. LdL at 929. 
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The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of 
wife's motion to set aside judgment because "[a]lthough the trial 
court displayed great patience in dealing with this case, we 
cannot avoid the conclusion, on the basis of the contentions 
before this Court, that an injustice may have been perpetrated by 
defendant's actions. Accordingly,, we are compelled to the 
conclusion that the trial judge abused his discretion in not 
allowing plaintiff a hearing under Rule 60(b)." Id. at 931-32 
(emphasis added). It is clear from this language that, where 
allegations in a Rule 60(b) motion are raised which may 
constitute an injustice, the trial court must at least hold a 
hearing on these issues. 
In the present case, the Wife moved the court to set aside 
the decree because the decree and findings signed by the court, 
and drafted by the Husband, were drastically different from the 
Ruling entered by the trial court. It is very clear from the 
Ruling that the trial court's intent was to award nearly equal 
shares of the marital estate to each party. 
In the Ruling, the trial court awarded the Husband the 
closely held business, valued at $195,735, and a camp trailer 
valued at $2,000. Therefore the Husband received $197,735 from 
the marital estate. The Ruling awarded the Wife the marital 
residence and property, the farm equipment, piano, time share 
condo interest, and an all terrain vehicle, all valued at 
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$176,000, and the net difference in the IRA Accounts, $14,176 
plus $5,000 for the purchase of a reasonable automobile. This 
totals $195,176, or $2,559 less than what was awarded to the 
Husband. 
Wife, as requested by the trial court, submitted findings 
and a decree which mirrored the court's Ruling in this regard. 
Husband objected and submitted his own findings and decree which 
completely modified the valuation of the business. Specifically, 
where the Ruling plainly states that "[t]he Court, based upon a 
totality of the evidence, from an examination of the exhibits 
adduced and from the record determines that the value of the 
business is $195,735 and makes the following findings to support 
that conclusion . . . ." The trial court then went on to enter 
the findings to support this valuation, and specifically found 
that the value of the business should be offset by $55,565 for 
the liens payable to Zion's First National Bank. The findings 
submitted by the Husband, and not reviewed at any hearing, 
materially changed the trial court's Ruling. 
The findings submitted by Husband state that "[b]ased on the 
evidence received by the Court, the Court determines the value of 
that business to be $177,562.05/' This figure is $18,172.95 less 
than the figure which the trial court determined to be the value 
of the business. 
The Ruling states, in item 4, that "[t]he net difference in 
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the IRA Accounts, $14,176 plus $5,000 which is the value of a 
reasonable automobile, are awarded to the [Wife] in addition/7 
Again, the findings and decree grossly modify this Ruling of the 
trial court without a hearing on the issues. The decree 
submitted by Husband states that the Wife "is awarded her IRA and 
$7,088.00 of the [Husband's] IRA accounts to equalize those 
accounts/' This diminishes the amount that the trial court 
determined in its Ruling that the Wife should be awarded from the 
Husband's IRA by $7,088.2 
In addition, the trial court clearly stated in its Ruling 
that the Husband "will be ordered to maintain medical insurance 
for the benefit of the children and the parties are ordered to 
share any medical expense not covered by insurance, 50/50/' This 
Ruling of the trial court was also modified by the Husband in the 
Decree which states that: 
The [Husband] is responsible to obtain and maintain 
medical insurance for the minor children as long as it 
can be acquired at a reasonable cost. Each party is 
ordered to pay equally the out-of-pocket costs for the 
premium actually incurred by the parent for the 
children's portion of the insurance. Each party is 
further ordered to pay equally all reasonable and 
necessary uninsured medical expenses, including 
deductibles and copayments incurred for the minor 
children, actually paid. 
Therefore, where the trial court clearly ruled that the Husband 
was to maintain insurance for the children and the parties would 
2
 Please note that the $5,000 figure for a reasonable 
car was retained from the Ruling in the Decree. 
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equally split the uninsured medical costs, the Husband's Decree 
modified this, without a hearing, to require the Wife to pay an 
equal share of premium costs in addition to the equal share of 
the uninsured expenses, and modified the Ruling to only require 
the Husband to maintain insurance for the children "as long as it 
can be acquired at a reasonable cost." 
The aforementioned reductions of the award to Wife made 
in the trial court's Ruling as compared to the decree and 
findings submitted by Husband greatly prejudice the Wife, 
This prejudice is even more apparent when considered in 
light that even where the business was valued at $195,735 as 
the trial court did in its Ruling, this figure is much 
smaller than the calculation made by James Drollinger,3 
Wife's CPA expert witness, or the figure which Husband used 
in his certified personal financial statement which was 
completed on November 24, 1997. This financial statement 
was admitted as Respondent's Exhibit 6 at trial, and is 
attached hereto as Addendum K. 
In this statement, Husband represented, warranted and 
certified that his net worth was $485,527. Of this amount, 
the house and real property was valued at $185,000. This 
3
 $279,262 net value. 
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leaves approximately $300,000 of net worth not including the 
house or property awarded to the Wife,. The statement 
clearly states that Husband valued his equipment, welder, 
tools, gravel and other inventory and the camp trailer 
awarded to him at $247,000. 
Wife clearly raised these mistakes, surprises, 
inadvertencies, excusable neglect or possible fraud on the 
trial court in her pro se motion to set aside the judgment. 
In addition, the issues raised in the pro se motion 
certainly allege an adequate "reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment" under Rule 60(b). No hearing was 
held on Wife's pro se motion. The trial court denied her motion 
because: (1) the issues raised in the motion had all been 
previously heard by the trial court; (2) the court had heard 
substantial evidence regarding the value of the business; (3) the 
Wife had the chance to include evidence on any assets at trial; 
and for the reasons raised in Husband's Memorandum in Opposition 
to Motion for Relief from Judgment. (Order, R. 234). The 
reasons to deny Wife's motion raised in Husband's memorandum were 
because: (1) the motion failed to set forth the requisite grounds 
to set aside a judgment; (2) the issues raised in the motion were 
addressed when the parties submitted their respective findings 
and decree; (3) the parties stipulated at the Order to Show Cause 
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hearing that they had resolved the remaining issues before the 
trial court; (4) the trial court's decision is accurate and 
should not be set aside. (R. 220) 
As many of these issues are intertwined some are addressed 
together. First, the issues raised in Wife's pro se motion 
had not been addressed by the trial court since the trial 
and the court's Ruling. The Ruling used clear and precise 
language and reasoning in valuing the marital estate and 
dividing it nearly equally. The arbitrary modification of 
this division was never addressed or argued. Wife, as 
requested, submitted the findings and a decree which 
mirrored the Ruling of the court. Husband, while not 
objecting or responding to the trial court's Ruling, 
objected to Wife's findings and decree. Husband then 
submitted his own findings and decree which substantially 
altered the court's Ruling. Wife filed a pro se Response on 
August 12, 1998. (R. 141). No hearing was held on the 
issues raised in the Wife's proposed findings and decree, or 
Husband's objection or in the pro se response filed by the 
Wife. 
Second, it is undisputed that the trial court heard 
substantial testimony and received evidence as to the 
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valuation of the business. After hearing all of this 
testimony and considering all of the evidence, the trial 
court entered it's Ruling which unequivocally values the 
business at $195,735. No further testimony was given. No 
further evidence was admitted. However, the value of the 
business was modified by the findings submitted by the 
Husband to $177,562.05. Certainly at least a hearing should 
be held to determine why the carefully calculated and 
supported value of the business as clearly stated in the 
trial court's Ruling was modified by nearly $20,000 by the 
findings submitted by Husband. 
Third, as to the modifications in the valuation of the 
business, the IRA award and the change in the payment of the 
premium for the children, the issue of evidence which should 
have been submitted at trial is irrelevant. Sufficient 
evidence was submitted at trial to support the trial court's 
Ruling and the award made by the trial court in its Ruling, 
while the issues and evidence was fresh, should not be 
arbitrarily modified without a hearing as to why the 
modifications should be made. 
Fourth, as stated above, Wife's pro se motion clearly 
raises adequate grounds to set aside the judgment. Without 
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some record to determine why the trial court's Ruling was 
modified so drastically in the findings and decree, 
certainly the issues of mistake, inadvertence, excusable 
neglect, or surprise are raised. In addition, in light of 
the substantial discounted valuation, and the substantial 
prejudice to Wife caused by this valuation, entered by the 
trial court in its Ruling (and even more so in the Findings) 
as compared to the valuation done by Mr. Drollinger, or as 
certified by Husband in his financial statement, Wife's 
motion alleges an adequate reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the decree which would further prejudice her. 
Fifth, the parties did not stipulate to any of these issues 
at the Order to Show Cause hearing. The order to show cause only 
dealt with the issues raised therein.4 The only issues that 
the parties stipulated to resolve were the issues "raised in 
[Husband's] Order to Show Cause and [Wife's] Counterclaim . 
. . ." (R. 178). The modifications made to the Ruling by 
the decree and findings were not stipulated to, included in 
any order, or addressed at the hearing. (Transcript of 
4
 Medical cost reimbursement, time share maintenance 
costs, timing of the payments due from Husband for the 
automobile replacement and attorney's fees award, removal of 
personal property, and the waiver and release of the other 
claims "raised in [Husband's] Order to Show Cause and 
[Wife's] Counterclaim . . . ." (R. 178). 
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Hearing on Order to Show Cause, R. 320). 
The final reason for the denial of Wife's pro se was 
that "the trial court's decision is accurate and should not be 
set aside/' The trial court's Ruling valued the business at 
$195,735. The findings entered by the court valued the 
business at $177,562.05. The Ruling clearly awarded Wife 
$14,176 from Husband's IRA. The decree awarded Wife only 
$7,088 from Husband's IRA. Without any record as to why 
these modifications were made and no opportunity to have a 
hearing on the changes, it is not clear which decision by 
the trial court is accurate. 
The Utah Supreme Court clearly held that where the 
evidence supports allegations that an injustice may have occurred 
at the trial level "we are compelled to the conclusion that the 
trial judge abused his discretion in not allowing [the movant] a 
hearing under Rule 60(b)." Boyce, at 931-32. In addition, 
"[d]iscretion must be exercised in furtherance of justice and the 
court will incline toward granting relief in a doubtful case to 
the end that the party may have a hearing." Id. At 931 (quoting 
Warren, 260 P.2d at 743 (citation omitted). In the present 
case, the changes from the trial court's well-reasoned and 
supported Ruling to the findings and decree can only be 
explained by mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
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neglect. These changes substantially prejudiced Wife and 
created an unjust and unfair result requiring that the 
decree be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Wife respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's dismissal 
of Wife's Motion for Relief from Judgment and remand the 
matter with directions to the trial court to set aside the 
decree. A decree should enter in conformity with the actual 
ruling of the trial court. 
Respondent requests her costs incurred in this appeal 
pursuant to Rule 34 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /?_ day of AUGUST, 1999. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, PC 
miAN C. GARDNER 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT were mailed, first 
class, postage prepaid, to: 
CLARK B. ALLRED 
MCKEACHNIE, ALLRED & MCCLELLAN 
855 East 200 North (112-10) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
on this /c3 day of AUGUST, 1999 
-fr^pS-./. 
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ADDENDUM A 
R u l e 6 0 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 8 6 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts 
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any 
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of 
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in 
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so 
corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvert-
ence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by 
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application: or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons 
(1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
(Amended effective April 1, 1998.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1998 
amendment eliminates as grounds for a motion 
the following: "(4) when, for any cause, the 
summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 
4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action." This basis for a motion is not found 
in the federal rule. The committee concluded 
the clause was ambiguous and possibly in con-
"Any other reason justifying relief." 
—Default judgment. 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. 
—Incompetent counsel. 
—Lack of due process. 
— Merits of case. 
— Mistake or inadvertence. 
— Mutual mistake. 
—Real party in interest. 
—Refund of fine after dismissal. 
Appeals. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
—Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment. 
Void judgment. 
— Estate record. 
—Inherent power of courts. 
—Intent of court and parties. 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
—Order prepared by counsel. 
flict with rules permitting service by means 
n other than personal service, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
i ment deleted the former fourth ground for a 
/ l  motion in Subdivision (b>. as described in the 
Advisory Committee Note above, and renum-
f  bered the grounds accordingly. 
: Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
 Rule 60, F.R.C.P. 
—Predating of new trial motion. 
Court's discretion. 
Default judgment. 
Effect of set-aside judgmen:. 
—Admissions. 
Federal law. 
Form of motion. 
Fraud. 
—Burden of proof. 
— Divorce action. 
Independent action. 
—Constitutionality of taxes. 
—Divorce decree. 
—Fraud or duress. 
— Motion distinguished. 
Invalid summons. 
—Amendment without nonce. 
Inequity of prospective application. 
Jurisdiction. 
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect. 
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ADDENDUM B 
CLARK B ALLRED - 0055 
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
855 East 200 North (112-10) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (435) 722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
WESLEY JOHN HARLAN, JR., 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
BONNIE KATHLEEN HARLAN, ) Civil No. 974000100 DA 
Defendant. ) Judge: John R. Anderson 
The above captioned matter came before the Court for trial 
on May 28, 1998. The Petitioner was present with his attorney 
Clark B Allred. The Respondent was present with her attorney 
Hollis S. Hunt. Testimony and documentary evidence was received by 
the Court. The Court also received argument from counsel and took 
the matter under advisement. The Court after having reviewed the 
testimony, Exhibits and case law presented by counsel entered its 
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Ruling on June 16, 1998. Based thereon the Court enters the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were husband and wife, having married 
September 11, 1962. The parties resided in Duchesne County, Utah 
and the Respondent had been a resident of Duchesne County for more 
than three months prior to the filing of the complaint for divorce. 
The parties have been separated for a substantial period of time 
and the court believes the differences between the parties is not 
reconcilable. 
2. The parties are the parents of three children as issue 
of this marriage, Amber born September 11, 1981, Kalene born August 
6, 1983 and Jason born March 11, 1985. The custody of the children 
was not an issue in this case. 
3. The parties are the owners of an 80-acre farm with a 
mobile home which farm is located on Myton Bench. That home and 
property is free and clear of all liens and encumbrances. The 
parties stipulated to the Court receiving an appraisal (exhibit 1) 
which set the value of the farm at $157,000.00. The appraisal 
included the value of the irrigation system and wheel lines. The 
parties also stipulated to the value. 
4. The parties also have farm equipment with a value of 
$2,500.00, an all terrain four wheel vehicle having a value of 
$2,500.00, a piano having a value of $2,000.00, and a time share 
Condominium in Park City, Utah with a value of $12,000.00. 
5. The parties also are the owners of a limited liability 
company known as John Harlan Excavation, which is a construction 
business owning several pieces of construction equipment. Based on 
the evidence received by the Court, the Court determines the value 
of that business to be $177,562.05. The Court determines that 
value as follows: 
A. The parties stipulated to the Court receiving an 
appraisal regarding the equipment which set the value of the 
equipment and machinery of the business at $234,100.00. (exhibit 2) 
B. There is a welder which was not included in the 
appraisal, which welder has a value of $2,200.00. 
C. The Court in reviewing the photographs of the equipment 
and reviewing the financial statement, exhibit six and other 
information provided, determines that the value for supplies and 
parts is $2,000.00, the value of tools and gravel inventory is 
$2,000.00, that there are accounts receivable in the amount of 
$9,000.00 and cash at the time of trial in the amount of $3,000.00 
which are assets of the business. 
D. The business is subject to debts at Zions First 
National Bank in the amount of $74,737.95. exhibit four. 
E. The business is basically a sole proprietorship 
dependant on the skill, reputation and work of the Petitioner. 
There is no good will independent of the future earning ability of 
the Petitioner. If the Petitioner were to die or no longer operate 
the business the value would only be the value of the equipment 
accounts, inventory and cash. See Sorensen vs Sorensen, 83 9 P.2d 
774 (Utah 1992). 
6. The Petitioner also has a camp trailer in his 
possession that has a value of $2,000.00. 
7. The Petitioner has an IRA having a value of $14,700.00 
and the Respondent's IRA has a value of $524.00. 
8. From the accounting testimony and the exhibits it 
appears that the debts owed to Zions First National Bank are fairly 
short term and the payments are structured to reduce that debt at 
a rapidly declining balance. This shows good judgement on the part 
of the parties to decrease their debt, but also increases the 
potential income attributable to the Petitioner. 
9. Based on the evidence received the Petitioner has 
ability and does generate $4,000.00 gross income per month before 
taxes. This amount includes $700,00 per month that he receives in 
benefit from the business, including use of a company truck, 
gasoline, meals and insurance. These items benefit the Petitioner 
even though they are business deductions. 
10. The Respondent worked at Bow Valley for two or three 
years but has not worked for some period of time and does not 
currently have full time employment but the Court believes that she 
is capable of finding full time employment, capable of training and 
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upgrading her skills to at least find a minimum wage job at 4 0 
hours per week. 
11. The Respondent has contributed to the rapid payoff of 
the debt and acquisition of business assets and has sacrificed to 
a certain extent with regard to her demands for improvement on the 
family home. Because the Respondent is and has been frugal in her 
needs she should not be punished for her conservative habits in 
determining alimony and she is in need of an equalization of 
income. 
12. Because of the rapid pay-off of the indebtedness of the 
company equipment, the fast depreciation being applied, the 
Petitioner's active participation in the company and its earning 
record the Petitioner has the ability to produce enough income to 
provide for spousal support. 
13. This has been a 30-year marriage and alimony is 
appropriate in this case. 
14. The Petitioner will get a tax benefit from the alimony 
payments and in addition, will benefit from claiming the minor 
children as dependents for income tax calculations. 
15. The Respondent filed a 1997 tax return claiming the 
exemptions for the children without significant taxable income. 
Therefore, the Respondent should be ordered to file an amended 
return deleting the claim to the exemptions so that the Petitioner 
may claim the exemptions for the children in 1997. The Petitioner 
will have the greater need and benefit for the exemption in the 
future. 
16. The Respondent has incurred attorney fees, accounting 
fees and costs. The Court believes that she should be reimbursed 
for part of the attorney fees and costs she has incurred in the 
amount of $5000.00 which amount the court believes is a reasonable 
amount. 
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Conclusions of Law 
1. The parties are entitled to a Decree of Divorce the 
same to become final upon signing and entry. 
2. The Respondent is entitled to the award of custody of 
the children with the Petitioner having reasonable rights of 
visitation which at a minimum shall be as set forth in the state 
guidelines. 
3. A fair and equitable division of the parties' assets 
will be to award the construction business including the equipment, 
machinery, tools, inventory, cash and assets of that business 
together with the camp trailer to the Petitioner, which assets have 
a total value of $179,562.00 and to award to *the Respondent the 
home and real estate, the farm equipment, the four wheel drive all 
terrain vehicle, piano, and the time share having a value of 
$176,000.00. 
4. The net difference in the parties IRAs should be 
distributed to the Respondent so that both parties have equal 
values. In addition the Petitioner should pay the Respondent the 
sum of $5000.00 so that she can acquire a suitable automobile. 
5. The Court in determining child support will set the 
Petitioner's gross income at $4,000.00 per month and the 
Respondent's income at minimum wage ($893.00) and will use the 
child support table to determine the amount of child support. 
6. Based on the length of the marriage and the income and 
expenses of the parties the Petitioner should be ordered to pay the 
Respondent the sum of $1000.00 per month as alimony. 
7. The Petitioner having the majority of the income should 
be awarded the tax exemptions for the children. In addition the 
Respondent should be ordered to file an amended return for 1997 so 
that the Petitioner can claim the children on his tax return for 
1997. 
8. The Petitioner should be ordered to provide medical 
insurance for the benefit of the children with the parties ordered 
to share all non covered medical expenses on an equal basis. 
9. The Petitioner should be ordered to pay the Respondent 
the sum of $5000.00 as partial reimbursement for attorney fees and 
costs. 
DATED this 17 day of tftriV, 1998. 
judge John R. Anderson 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE ) 
Cheree Brotherson, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the office of McKEACHNIE, ALLRED & 
McCLELLAN, P.C., Clark B Allred attorney for Plaintiff, herein; 
that she served the attached FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, upon Defendant by placing a true and correct copy thereon in 
an envelope addressed to: 
Mr. Hollis S. Hunt 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
392 East 12300 South, Suite A 
Draper, Utah 84020 
and delivered the same, sealed, first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Roosevelt, Utah, on the 2 8th 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of 
Notary Public / 
J u l y , 1998. 
Notary Public 
HEATHER HOYT 
121 West Main 
Vemai. Utah 84078 
My Commission Expires 
September 19.2001 
State of Utah 
I 
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ADDENDUM C 
CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055 
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
855 East 200 North (112-10) 
Roosevelt, Utah 34066 
Telephone: (435) 722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
WESLEY JOHN HARLAN,JR., 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) 
BONNIE KATHLEEN HARLAN, ) 
) Civil No. 974000100 DA 
Respondent. ) Judge John R. Anderson 
Pursuant to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made 
in this matter, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Petitioner is awarded a decree of divorce from the 
Respondent, the same to become final upon signing and entry. 
2. Respondent is awarded custody of the parties minor 
children subject to the Petitioner having reasonable rights of 
visitation with the children which at a minimum shall be as set 
FILED 
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forth in the State guidelines. 
3. The Petitioner is awarded the construction business 
including the equipment, machinery, tools, inventory, cash and 
assets of the business and the camp trailer and the personal 
property in his possession. 
4. The Respondent is awarded the home and real estate, 
farm equipment, four wheel drive all terrain vehicle, piano, and 
the Park City condo time share, furniture and personal property in 
her possession. 
5. The Petitioner is awarded his IRA account less the 
amount awarded to the Respondent. 
6. The Respondent is awarded her IRA and $7,088.00 of the 
Petitioner's IRA accounts to equalize those accounts. The 
Petitioner is ordered to pay the Respondent the sum of $5,000.00 
for the Respondent to acquire an automobile. 
7. The Petitioner is ordered to pay the Respondent the sum 
of $986.12 per month as child support (see attached worksheet). 
The child support award shall be reduced by 50% for each child for 
time periods in which the Petitioner has the children for extended 
2 
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visitation under this decree for at least 25 or any 30 consecutive 
days. Child support shall be paid for each child until that child 
reaches age 18 or graduates from high school which ever occurs 
last. 
8. The Petitioner is responsible to obtain and maintain 
medical insurance for the minor children as long as it can be 
acquired at a reasonable cost. Each party is ordered to pay 
equally the out-of-pocket costs for the premium actually incurred 
by the parent for the children's portion of insurance. Each party 
is further ordered to pay equally all reasonable and necessary 
uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and copayments 
incurred for the minor children, and actually paid. When either 
party has insurance, they are ordered to provide verification of 
the coverage to the other party, and when a party incurs medical 
expenses, they are ordered to provide written verification of the 
cost of payment of those expenses to the other party within thirty 
(30) days. 
9. The Petitioner is ordered to pay the Respondent the sum 
of $1,000.00 per month as alimony until the Respondent remarries 
3 
1ST 
cohabitates or for a time period equal to the length of the 
marriage which ever event occurs first. 
10. The Petitioner is ordered to pay the Respondent the sum 
of $5,000.00 as partial reimbursement for the attorney fees and 
costs she incurred and Judgment is entered for that amount. 
11. The Petitioner is awarded the tax exemptions for the 
minor children. 
12. The Respondent is ordered to file an amended 1997 tax 
return and to not claim the children as exemptions but to allow the 
Petitioner to claim the children as tax exemptions for 1997. 
Petitioner is awarded the tax exemptions for the children in future 
years. 
13. The parties are order to sign and deliver the 
documents necessary to carry out the terms of this decree. 
c:\wp51\text\harlan\decree 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) 
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE ) 
ss 
Cheree Brotherson, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the office of McKEACHNIE, ALLRED & 
McCLELLAN, P.C,, Clark B Allred attorney for Plaintiff, herein; 
that she served the attached DECREE OF DIVORCE, upon Defendant by 
placing a true and correct copy thereon in an envelope addressed 
to: 
Mr. Hollis S. Hunt 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
392 East 12300 South, Suite A 
Draper, Utah 84020 
and delivered the same, sealed, first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Roosevelt, Utah, on the 28th 
day of July, 1998 
IKenree^lTrotherson 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of 
July, 1998 
Notary Public 
HEATHER HOYT 
121 West Main 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
My Commission Expires 
September 19.2001 
" l i e " " " " • 
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Notary Public / 
State of Utah /T6 
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY JOHN HARLAN, JR. 
vs. 
BONNIE KATHLEEN HARLAN 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY) 
Civil No, 974000100 DA 
CSUPPORT Software Licensed to 
McKeachnie & Allred, P. C. 
1. Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this 
mother and father for whom support is to be awarded. 
2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly 
income. Refer to Instructions for definition of 
income. 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually 
paid. (Do not enter alimony ordered for this case). 
2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not 
1 enter obligations ordered for the children in Line 1). 
2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the 
Children in Present Home Worksheet for either parent. 
3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the 
Adjusted Gross Income for child support purposes. 
4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number 
of children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the 
Base Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here 
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 
3 by the COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3. 
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain 
[each parent's share of the Base Support Obligation. 
MOTHER 
lllllllllll/ 
l l l l l l l l l l l 
$ 893.00 
- .00 
- .00 
.00 
$ 893.00 
/////////// 
/////////// 
/////////// 
18.3 % 
$ 220.88 
FATHER 
1/////////// 
; 1IIIIII1II1 
$ 4,000.00 
- .00 
- .00 
.00 
$ 4,000.00 
/////////// 
l l l l l l l l l l l 
l l l l l l l l l l l 
81.7 % 
$ 986.12 
COMBINED 
3 
! IIIurnII\ 
1 III 1111111\ 
Ill/Ill'///A 
i iiiiin/ik 
m i II 111 ii 
immmA 
iIIIIIIII'ii\\ 
i m 111111A 
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$ 4,893.00 
$ 1,207.00 
llllllllll\ 
//////// lll\ 
I III 1IIIIl\ 
11111111111\ 
7. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount in Line 6 
for the Obligor Parent or enter the amount from the Low Income 
Table. „______ 
986.12 
9. 
10. 
Which parent is the obligor? ( ) Mother KX) Father 
Is the support award ordered different from the guideline amount in Line 7? 
KX) Yes ( ) No If YES, enter the amount ordered: $687.00 
What were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation? 
( ) property settlement 
( ) excessive debts of the marriage 
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent 
( ) other: 
Attorney Bar No. 0055 ( ) Electronic filing ( ) Manual filing 
Unlicensed use of the CSUPPORT computer soff/axe :s * violation of U.S. Copyright Law 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
WESLEY JOHN HARLAN, 
Petitioner, 
vs 
BONNIE K. HARLAN, 
Respondent. 
J R . , : ) MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
) JUDGEMENT OR ORDER 
) JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
) CASE NO. 9740001OODA 
Pursuant to UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 60(b), Respondent Bonnie K. 
Harlan hereby enters this Motion for relief of judgement with respect to the 
following items as stated in the DECREE OF DIVORCE signed by Judge John R. 
Anderson dated August 19, 1998. 
Copies of the RULING signed by Judge John R. Anderson dated June 10, 1998, 
the DECREE OF DIVORCE SIGNED by Judge John R. Anderson dated August 19,1998, 
and FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW signed by Judge John R. Anderson 
dated August 19,1998 are attached. Also attached is a copy of URCP Rule 
60(b). 
1. Item 4. on page 3 of the RULING states: "The net difference in the IRA 
Accounts, $14,176 plus $5,000 which is the value of a reasonable 
automobile, are awarded to the Respondent in addition." 
1 
BONNIE K. HARLAN 
P.O. 513 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
November /'0 , 1998 
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Item 6. on page 2 of the DECREE OF DIVORCE states: "The Respondent is 
awarded her IRA and $7,088.00 of the Petitioner's IRA accounts to 
equalize those accounts. The Petitioner is ordered to pay the 
Respondent the sum of $5,000.00 for the Respondent to acquire an 
automobile. 
Item 5. on page 2 of the DECREE OF DIVORCE states: "The Petitioner is 
awarded his IRA account less the amount awarded to the Respondent." 
Relief for the Respondent from these inconsistent declarations of judgement is 
sought by making the final award to the Respondent as stated clearly in Item 
4. of the RULING: "The net difference in the IRA Accounts, $14,176 plus 
$5,000 which is the value of a reasonable automobile, are awarded to the 
Respondent in addition." 
2. Item 10. on page 5 of the RULING states in part: "The Petitioner will be 
ordered to maintain medical insurance for the benefit of the children 
and the parties are ordered to share any medical expense not covered by 
insurance, 50/50. Also, Mr. Allred in his FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW in Item 8 on page 9 thereof states: "The Petitioner 
should be ordered to provide medical insurance for the benefit of the 
children with the parties ordered to share all non covered medical 
expenses on an equal basis." 
Item 8. on page 3 of the DECREE OF DIVORCE states: "The Petitioner is 
responsible to obtain and maintain medical insurance for the minor 
children as long as it can be acquired at a reasonable cost. Each party 
^?/4 
is ordered to pay equally the out-of-pocket costs for the premium 
actually incurred by the parent for the children's portion of 
insurance. ..." 
Relief for the Respondent from these contradictory statements is sought by 
declaring as final the provision in Item 10 on page 5 of the RULING which 
states: "The Petitioner will be ordered to maintain medical insurance for the 
benefit of the children and the parties are ordered to share any medical 
expense not covered by insurance, 50/50." 
NOTE: The Respondent was present at the hearing on May 28, 1998. The 
provisions in the RULING were apparently based upon that hearing (See first 
two paragraphs of the RULING). RESPONDENT was NOT present at any subsequent 
hearing or consultation in this matter until a hearing in Roosevelt, Utah 
September 24,1998 on an Order To Show Cause filed by Petitioner's attorney 
All red. Subsequent to the hearing on May 28, 1998 Respondent's legal counsel 
has been less than satisfactory. Hence, Respondent had no input or 
opportunity of rebuttal to any provisions of the DECREE OF DIVORCE or the 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW which were apparently prepared and 
submitted by Mr. Allred, Attorney for the Petitioner. Therefore Relief for 
Respondent is properly sought under the provisions of URCP Rule 60(b). 
Respondent also presents a Motion for relief from judgements and orders which 
were based upon evaluations of the family business as follows: 
3. PETITIONER'S Exhibit #6, Personal Financial Statement of W. John Harlan as 
of November 24, 1997 for Zion's First National Bank as signed by W. John 
Harlan shows total assets of $572,000.00; Liabilities totaling 
$86,473.00 yielding a net worth of $485,527.00. The net worth amount 
3
 < # / / 
included Real Estate evaluated at $185,000.00. Thus the net worth of W. 
John Harlan according to his own financial statement excluding the real 
estate (which the court awarded to his spouse) was $300,527.00. 
The value of Petitioner's business was carefully and accurately 
evaluated by a Certified Public Accountant, James Drollinger as 
$342,000.00. This amount did not include accounts receivable of 
$9,000.00 and cash on hand of $3,000.00 (see RULING page 3. lines 4 & 
5). Thus the total value of the business was $354,000.00. The RULING at 
page 3. line 6 states that liens payable to Zion's First National Bank 
totaled $55,565.00. However, a letter from Allred states that the total 
debts of the business is $74,738.00 (it is assumed that this amount 
includes all outstanding liens against the business). Thus the net 
worth of the business according to James Drollinger, C.P.A., and 
Attorney All red's statement of total debt of the business becomes 
$279,262.00. 
The RULING at page 3,line 8 states that the company has a value of 
$196,735.00 after a correction of an arithmetical error and based, 
supposedly, upon Allred, Cameron, Baker evaluations. 
At least seventeen (17) major items of equipment belonging to the 
business were not listed in the Petitioner's equipment inventory and 
which are not included in the "additional tools and inventory gravel". 
Respondent is aware of this equipment. She was secretary and bookkeeper 
for the business for many years. 
These seventeen items are: 
a. Pickup truck, 1995 Chevrolet 1 ton,4WD, extended cab 
b. Pickup truck, 1984 GMC 3/4 ton, 4WD 
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c. Computer System 
d. Safety breathing apparatus (Air tanks, controller, and masks) 
e. Engineer's Level, Tripod, and Level Rod. Wild. 
f. Xerox 5309 Copier 
g. Toxic gas detector (Saf T Mate LEL/02) 
h. Propane portable space heater outfit. (Salamander) 
I. Metal storage building, (dog house) 
j. Semi van trailer used for storage (approx 40 foot) 1967 American Van 
k. Two 5000 gal. storage tanks 
1. Cellular telephones (at least 4) 
m. Compactor 
n. High pressure washer-cleaner 
o. Two (2) "5th Wheel" Slides 
p. Various lengths and sizes of CMP Culverts 
q. Conveyor belt frames and idlers 
This list does not include the supplies and parts called for in the 
Ruling at page 3, line 3. 
To summarize: 
W. John Harlan's estimated value of his business $300,527.00 
James Drollinger & Atty. Allred estimate $279,262.00 
The RULING, page 3, line 8 estimate $196,735.00 
The FINDINGS OF FACT Item 5. page 3 estimate $177,562.00 
The FINDINGS OF FACT estimate is grossly in error because the Respondent 
did not stipulate to the appraisal regarding the equipment which set the 
value of the equipment and machinery of the business at $234,100.00. 
Furthermore this estimate did not include the value of at least the 
seventeen (17) major items of equipment listed above. 
J&9 
Respondent seeks Relief from this mistake in estimating the value of the 
business by eliminating the highest and lowest estimates and averaging the two 
intermediate estimates: to obtain $237,998.50 as the value to be used in 
recalculating equalization of assets as follows: 
To Wesley John Harlan, Jr., Petitioner 
Average value of business $237,998.00 
Camp Trailer 2,000.00 
John's IRA 14,700.00 
Total John's Assets $254,698.50 
To Bonnie Kathleen Harlan, Respondent 
Appraised Farm Value 
Farm Equipment 
ATV 
Piano 
Park City Condos 
Bonnie's IRA 
Total Bonnie's Assets 
$157,000.00 
2,500.00 
2,500.00 
2,000.00 
12,000.00 
524-.00 
$176.524.00 
John's total assets exceeds Bonnie's total assets by $78,174.50 
Therefore to equalize the assets Petitioner will pay Respondent $39,087.25. 
To date, November 3, 1998, Petitioner has paid Respondent $17,088.25 of this 
amount. This includes $5,000.00 each for court awarded car allowance and 
partial reembursment of attorney's fees plus one-half of the difference of the 
IRA accounts which was "rolled over" from John's account to Bonnie's account. 
5
 £6* 
Thus the outstanding balance due to Bonnie from John to "equalize the values 
of the assets" is $21, 999. 25. 
Respectfully, 
% IS 
Bonnie K. Harlan 
Date/Uft/fl /??? 
PQ<rv)\v^ M, nizug^y 
APPROVED BY THE COURT THIS DAY OF 1998 
Judge JOHN R. ANDERSON 
7
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Bonnie K. Harlan, do hereby certify that on the /p th day of November 1998 
I have personally hand delivered to the Clerk of the EIGHTH JUDICIAL COURT for 
Duchesne County in the City of Roosevelt, Utah a true copy of a Motion for 
Relief from Judgement of Order: Case No. 9740001OODA. I, Bonnie K. Harlan, 
do also certify that I have this /O day of November 1998, placed in the 
United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid copies of a Motion for Relief 
from Judgement or Order, Case No. 9740001OODA addressed to the following: 
Clark B. All red, Attorney for Petitioner 
855 East 200 North (112-10) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Wesley John Harlan, Petitioner 
P. 0. Box 1011 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
JOOYWU^^' tU J' a* 
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ADDENDUM E 
BY. 
n FILED 
DEC l a 1398 
!OAN^M«KEE. CLERK 
DEPUTY 
CLARK B ALLRED - 0055 
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
855 East 200 North (112-10) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (435) 722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
WESLEY JOHN HARLAN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BONNIE KATHLEEN HARLAN, 
Respondent 
ORDER 
Civil No. 974000100 DA 
Judge John R. Anderson 
The above captioned matter came before the Court pursuant 
to the Respondent's Motion for Relief From Judgment or Order. The 
Court has reviewed the prior proceedings of this case and the 
Memoranda filed by the parties. The issues raised by the 
Respondent have all been previously heard by the Court and a 
decision entered by the Court. The Court heard substantial 
evidence regarding the business assets and values. If Respondent 
did not include all assets at trial the court will not reopen the 
a^ 
case at this late date and such is not a basis for setting aside 
the Decree. The Court further finds that the Respondent's motion 
is without merit as the Court has already ruled on those issues. 
For the reason stated herein and in the Petitioner's Memorandum 
the Court denies the motion and Orders the Respondent to pay the 
Petitioner's fees incurred in responding to this motion in the 
amount of $240.00, as set forth in the affidavit submitted with 
this order. 
DATED this day of December, 
)istrict Judge 
John R. Anderson 
c:\wp51\text\harlan\order 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE ) 
Cheree Brotherson, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the office of McKEACHNIE, ALLRED & 
McCLELLAN, P.C., Clark B Allred attorney for Plaintiff, herein; 
that she served the attached ORDER, upon Defendant by placing a 
true and correct copy thereon in an envelope addressed to: 
Bonnie K. Harlan 
P 0 Box 513 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
and delivered the same, sealed, first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Roosevelt, Utah, on the 18th 
day of December, 1998. 
Cheree Brotherson 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18th day of December, 
1998. 
f V / V A /\[ \ I ^ 
—
 „ _
—
 Notary Public 
a m no •• »» ^ ™ ^ ^ * 
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ADDENDUM F 
°^>lrA:o 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR ^ C Q ^ O ^ 
s~\ / ' 6 '••• DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT^ j 0 °^ 
WESLEY JOHN HARLAN, JR., 
) 
Petitioner, RULING 
YS ) 
^Ory 
CASE NO: 974000100 DA 
BONNIE KATHLEEN HARLAN, 
Respondent. 
The above-captioned matter having come on regularly for Trial before the 
undersigned sitting regularly in Duchesne, May 28, 1998, The parties appearing in 
person and through counsel, Clark B. Allred respresenting Petitioner and Hollis S. Hunt, 
appearing for the Respondent. 
Evidence was adduced, argument having been made and the Court having taken 
the matter under advisement, now having fully considered the matter, the Court make 
the following Findings and Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decision: 
The parties were married September 11, 1968. They have three children as issue 
of the marriage; Amber, born September 11, 1981, Kaylene, born August 6, 1983 and 
Jason, born March 11, 1985. 
NON-BUSINESS MARITAL ASSET VALUES: 
The parties are the owners of a mobile home on an 80-acre farm on the Myton 
Bench. The home and real property is free and clear of liens. The parties stipulated to 
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an appraised value of $157,000. The appraisal apparently includes the value of the 
irrigation system and wheel lines. In addition, there is farm equipment having a value of 
$2,500, an all terraine four-wheel vehicle having a value of $2,500, a piano in the home 
having a value of $2,000 and a time-share condo in Park City which the record supports 
a value of $12,000. The parties also have an interest in equipment and a limited liability 
company known as John Harlan Excavation. John Harlan also ownes a camp trailer 
valued at $2,000. John has a cash IRA Account of $14,700. Bonnie's IRA Account is 
$524. One of the primary issues of the case is the valuation of the small business. The 
Respondent provided testimony from James Drollinger who was retained to appraise the 
business. The Petitioner submitted case law and support from Dale Cameron to the 
effect that the on-going or good-will value of a small business which depended soley upon 
the efforts of the proprietor should be determined on a net book value basis; that is, 
without any addition for good will or blue sky. 
BUSINESS VALUE: 
The Court, based upon a totality of the evidence, from an examination of the 
exhibits adduced and from the record determines that the value of the business is 
$195,735 and makes the following findings to support that conclusion: 
1. The equipment as per the appraisal which was set forth in Petitioner's Exhibit 
Two (2) showed a reasonable value of the equipment and machinery at $234,100. The 
parties stipulated to the introduction of the exhibit and it appears to be reasonable. 
There is testimony that a welder that was part of the equipment had a value of $2,200 
which was not included in that appraisal. The Court has also, from reviewing the 
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photographs of the equipment and having an analysis of the financial statement which is 
tendered and received into evidence as Exhibit Six (6), has determined there should be 
additional values for supplies and parts of $2,000 and additional tools and inventory of 
gravel in the amount of $2,000. Added to that should be accounts receivable of $9,000 
and cash at the time of trial of $3,000. Deduct liens payable to Zion's First National 
Bank of $55,565 without the addition of any value that would be attached to the business 
for good will as per Sorensen vs. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992), the company has a 
value of $195,735 and the Petitioner has in his possession a camp trailer with a value of 
$2,000. Assets were reviewed in order to provide a fairly equal distribution as follows: 
2. The equipment, machinery, tools, inventory and assets of the business, 
including the camp trailer with a value of $2,000, will be retained by the Petitioner; 
having the total value of $197,735. 
ASSET EQUALIZATION; 
3. The valuation of the real estate, farm equipment, four-wheel drive all-terrain 
vehicle, piano and the time share, total $176,000, will be awarded to the Respondent. 
4. The net difference in the IRA Accounts, $14,176 plus $5,000 which is the 
value of a reasonable automobile, are awarded to the Respondent in addition. 
PARTIES INCOME ANALYSIS; 
5. The Court will observe from the accounting testimony and examination of the 
exhibits, the business payments to reduce the debt at Zion's First National Bank as 
business assets are over a fairly short term; evidencing the rapidly declining balance. 
This shows good judgment on the part of both parties, but would also increase the 
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Court's subjective analysis of income factor attributable to the Petitioner. 
6. The Petitioner, from the evidence adduced and support of the record, can 
generate $4,000 per month before taxes. This amount assumes at least a $700 per month 
benefit or advantage from the small business. For example, private use of the company 
truck, meals, gasoline, insurance, etc. Those items are actually to the benefit of the 
Petitioner because they are expenses through the business and represent tax-free income 
to the Petitioner. 
7. There is testimony in the record that the Respondent worked for Bow Valley 
Petroleum for two or three years. Although she testified she was not current on 
marketable skills, the Court would expect her to find full-time employment and for 
purposes of alimony and child support, will assume that she is at least capable of training 
and upgrading skills so as to find a minimum wage job at 40 hours per week. 
8. Again, the evidence shows that the Respondent has contributed to the rapid 
pay-off of debt and acquisition of business assets and has sacrificed to a certain extent 
with regard to her demands for improvement of the family home. 
ALIMONY: 
9. The Court in analyzing factors and determining alimony will find that the 
recipient spouse, or the Respondent, is and has been, frugal in her needs. She should not 
be punished for her conservative habits and is in true need of an equalization of income. 
Her ability, based on her age, and her marketable skills, does not provide much more 
than the minimum wage earning capability at this time. Because of the rapid pay-off of 
the indebtedness on the company equipment, the fast depreciation being applied, and 
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Petitioner's active participation in the company and its earning record would indicate 
that the Petitioner in this case has the ability to produce enough income to provide for 
spousal support. These factors taken together with the almost 30-year marriage would 
make alimony or spousal support to the recipient appropriate in this case. The Court 
finds that a reasonable amount based upon all the factors in consideration and supported 
by the record, would be $1,000 per month. The Petitioner will have the tax benefit of a 
deduction for the alimony paid and the Court will assume that the Petitioner should also 
claim the minor children as dependants for income tax calculations and in all fairness to 
create a tax-neutral situation, the Court will allow the Petitioner to claim the children as 
dependants for his return for 1997 and will order that the spouse or Respondent to file 
an amended return enabling him to do so. 
CHJLD SUPPORT: 
10. Child support will be calculated from the tables recognizing a minimum wage 
income to the Respondent and a gross income figure for the Petitioner of $4,000 per 
month. The Petitioner will be ordered to maintain medical insurance for the benefit of 
the children and the parties are ordered to share any medical expense not covered by 
insurance, 50/50. 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS: 
11. The Court will not award any accounting fees to either party, but will reward 
the Respondent $5,000 for her total attorney fees. 
MISCELLANEOUS: 
12. The Court has not discussed matters which were stipulated to in the record, 
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such as child custody and visitation but will simply note that those matters should be 
included in the formal Findings and Fact and Decree. The Court will direct Mr. Hunt, 
attorney for the Respondent, to prepare appropriate Findings, Conclusions and Decree 
based upon the Court's Ruling; submit the same to Mr. Allred for approval and 
finalization by the Court. 
Dated this / ^ d a y ohc^'UL^ , 1998. 
'John R. Anderson 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on this /^pday of^—^4^7\JL^ > 1998,1 hand-
delivered or mailed, postage prepaid, the foregoing Rifling to the following parties 
Clark B. Allred 
Attorney for Petitioner 
855 East 200 North (112.10) 
Roosevelt, UT 84066 
Hollis S. Hunt 
Attorney for Respondent 
392 East 12300 South Suite A 
Draper, UT 
Clerl 
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ADDENDUM G 
HOLLIS S.HUNT-#1587 
Attorney for Respondent 
392 East 12300 South, Suite A 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Telephone: (801) 495-3500 
BY. 
FILED 
^ . .D ISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
OCT - & < 9 9 8 
JOAlMi\fc^,qKEE. CLERK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT, DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
WESLEY JOHN HARLAN, JR., ' 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. 
BONNIE KATHLEEN HARLAN, ; 
Respondent. ) 
) ORDER ON PETITIONER'S AND 
) RESPONDENT'S ORDERS TO 
) SHOW CAUSE 
) Civil No. 974000100DA 
i Judge John R. Anderson 
The Petitioner's and Respondent's respective Orders to Show Cause came on for 
hearing before the above-entitled Court on September 24, 1998, before the Honorable 
John R. Anderson, Judge of the above-entitled Court. The Petitioner was present and 
represented by and through his attorney, Clark B. AUred, and the Respondent was present 
and represented by and through her attorney, Hollis S. Hunt. At the time of the hearing, 
the parties entered into the record a stipulation and agreement to resolve their differences, 
the terms and conditions of which are reflected below in this Order. 
n* 
Based upon the stipulation, the Court now makes the following; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Medical Reimbursement The Petitioner, Wesley John Harlan, Jr., shall 
pay to the Respondent, Bonnie Kathleen Harlan, the sum of $409.92 for his share of 
medical costs paid by the Respondent for the benefit and use of the minor children of the 
parties. 
2. Timeshare Maintenance Costs. The Petitioner shall pay to the 
Respondent the sum of $228.62 for his portion of the timeshare maintenance expenses 
that were incurred prior to the time of the Decree of Divorce. 
3. Automobile Replacement. The Petitioner shall pay to the Respondent the 
sum of $5,000.00 for the automobile replacement cost required by the Decree of Divorce 
of August 20, 1998. 
4. Respondent's Attorney's Fees. The Petitioner shall pay to the Respondent 
the sum of $5,000.00 for the benefit and use of the Respondent's attorney as required in 
the Decree of Divorce of August 20, 1998. 
5. Payment Due Date. All sums above totaling $10,638.54 shall be paid by 
the Petitioner to the Respondent within (2) weeks from the date of this hearing on or 
before October 8, 1998. 
-2-
6. Removal of Personal Property, The Petitioner shall remove from the 
marital residence and property distributed to the Respondent in the Decree of Divorce of 
August 20, 1998, all personal property and various materials and equipment associated 
with his excavation business, which shall include but not be limited to a 40f semi-van, 
barrels of miscellaneous chemicals and compounds, scrap metal, trash, asphalt, concrete 
and trees from various excavation jobs. 
7. Release and Waiver of Respective Claims. The additional claims alleged 
in the Petitioner's Order to Show Cause and in the Respondent's Counterclaim are hereby 
waived and released by the parties with the exception of the Order of the Court stated 
above. 
8. Attorney's Fees. Each party shall bear their own respective attorney's fees 
that have been incurred in bringing these Orders to Show Cause and the hearing of 
September 24, 1998. 
DATED this Q.Y^ day of October, 1998. 
BY THE 
Divorce\Harlan Order on Order to Show Cause 
istrict Court Judge 
-3-
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ADDENDUM H 
BLED 
NOV 2 7 1998 
JOANNAS6 °SvnY 
CLARK B ALLRED - 0055 BY' 
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
855 East 200 North (112-10) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (435) 722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT UTAH 
WESLEY JOHN HARLAN, JR., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BONNIE KATHLEEN HARLAN, 
Respondent 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
JUDGMENT OR ORDER 
Civil No. 974000100 DA 
Judge John R. Anderson 
The Petitioner submits the following Memorandum In Opposition 
To the Respondent's Motion For Relief From Judgment or Order. 
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
The trial in this case was held on May 28, 1998. The Court 
submitted its Ruling on June 10, 1998. Both parties submitted 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce. Objections were submitted regarding the Respondent's 
procedure of calculating the IRA account, the evaluations of the 
£zc 
construction equipment, business and debts. The Court, on August 
19, 1998 approved the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce, submitted by the Petitioner and signed those 
documents. 
On September 24, 1998, the parties appeared at an Order To 
Show Cause hearing and after a discussion between the parties and 
their counsel, the parties submitted a stipulation and a proposed 
Order to the Court, which the parties agreed resolved all remaining 
issues between the parties. Shortly thereafter, Respondent's 
counsel withdrew. 
Respondent has now filed a document entitled Motion for Relief 
from Judgment or Order in which she complains about the manner in 
which the IRA was divided, the medical insurance provisions and the 
manner in which the construction equipment was valued. 
LAW 
The Respondent's Motion claims to be brought under Rule 60(b). 
Rule 60(b) requires that there be specific grounds set forth in the 
motion. Not one of the seven specific grounds required by Rule 
60(b) is cited by Respondent as a basis for her Motion. The moving 
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party, in addition to identifying the grounds for the motion, has 
the burden to prove those grounds. Kettner v. Snow 3 75 P.2d 28 
(Ut. App. 1962). The court in deciding a motion under Rule 60(b) 
generally does not look at the merits but first looks at whether 
the moving party has proven the grounds alleged in her Motion, 
Larsen v. Collins 684 P.2d 52 (Ut. App. 1984). 
DISCUSSION 
The Respondent's Motion should be denied for the following 
reasons: 
1. The Motion sets forth none of the grounds required under 
Rule 60(b), in fact the Motion does not even claim to rely on any 
of the grounds under Rule 60(b). Furthermore, the Respondent has 
not set forth any facts that would support or prove one of the 
grounds required under Rule 60(b). 
2. The issues complained of by the Respondent were raised by 
the parties when they submitted their respective Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and Objections. The 
Court has already ruled on these matters when the Court signed the 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree submitted by the 
Petitioner. 
3. The parties, at the Order To Show Cause hearing in 
September 1998, agreed that the stipulation and the order presented 
to the Court at that time resolved all remaining issues before the 
Court. 
4. The Court's decision is accurate and should not be set 
aside. The Court's Decree equally divided the retirement benefits 
between the parties as the Court ordered. The Petitioner has had 
the accounts equalized at the bank. The difference between the 
parties respective IRA's was $14,000.00 which amount was divided 
equally at the bank so each party has the same amount in their IRA. 
The Respondent, however, wanted the entire $14,000.00 difference 
added to her IRA. The Court has already denied that request. 
The provisions in the Decree on medical insurance are 
consistent with State law and with the Court's Ruling. The 
Petitioner is not sure what the Respondent's complaint is on the 
medical insurance. 
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The continued argument by Respondent regarding the evaluation 
of equipment and construction business has already been ruled on by 
the Court. The Court received stipulated expert evaluations 
regarding the equipment and the business, received testimony from 
the parties' regarding the assets of the business, cash flows, etc. 
Based on that evidence the Court entered its ruling regarding the 
value of the equipment and the construction business. That 
business value was not as high as the Respondent wanted, nor as low 
as the Petitioner requested. In fact the Petitioner may not be 
able to continue with the business due to the amounts he was 
ordered to pay the lack of income received by the business. The 
Court has already ruled and there is no basis to set aside that 
ruling. To adopt the Respondent's argument to take everybody's 
evaluations, throw out the high and low and average the rest would 
be improper. 
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that the Court deny 
the Motion and that the Respondent be required to pay the attorney 
fees incurred by the Petitioner as a result of the merit less 
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nature of this Motion since the issues involved have already been 
resolved by the Court. 
DATED this 25th day of November, 1998. 
c:\wp51\text\harlan\memo 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED & 
McCLELLANy/ffl. C. 
Attorneys fpr Petitioner 
BY: 
J?/S 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE ) 
Cheree Brotherson, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the office of McKEACHNIE, ALLRED & 
McCLELLAN, P.C., Clark B Allred attorney for Plaintiff, herein; 
that she served the attached MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER, upon Defendant by placing a true and 
correct copy thereon in an envelope addressed to: 
Bonnie K. Harlan 
P 0 Box 513 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
and delivered the same, sealed, first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Roosevelt, Utah, on the 25th 
day of November, 1998. 
Cheree Brotherson 
Subscribed and sworn to before me th^s 25th day of November, 
1998. 
•am anna saa ram "za ana mn 
Notary Puc'c a 
HEATHEHHQYT J 
121 West Main . 
Vernal. Utah 6*073 | 
My Commission Expires 
September 19.2C01 
Notary Public ' 
--x: aaea jku 
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ADDENDUM I 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
BONNIE K. HARLAN D E C " 3 1 " 8 
P . 0 . BOX 513 JOANNEM$E£.CLERK 
ROOSEVELT, UTAH 84066 BY W<^ DEPUV( 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OR UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
WESLEY JOHN HARLAN, JR., 
Petitioner, 
wc 
"5 , 
BONNIE K. HARLAN, ] 
Respondent. ] 
) RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO PETITIONER'S 
) MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
) MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
) JUDGEMENT OR ORDER 
i JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
1 CASE NO. 974000100DA 
Respondent at this time being without legal counsel respectfully presents this 
document to the Court for its consideration. References in this reply refer 
to Mr. Allred's MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGEMENT 
OR ORDER. 
Line: 2,3,4,— (third Sentence) The Court ordered Mr. Hunt, attorney for 
Respondent, to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce. However, Mr. All red also prepared a set of these documents and 
submitted them to the Court. 
Fourth Sentence: The Court's RULING awarded the net difference of the 
Petitioner's and Respondent's IRAS to the Respondent. ($14,176.00) 
Respondent made no objection to this decision of the Court on this item. 
With respect to the evaluation of the business, The Respondent's retained 
professional appraisal of the value of the business was apparently disregarded 
by the Court and Respondent's Counsel made no attempt to have the Respondent's 
professional appraisal given at least equal consideration with the 
Petitioner's submitted business evaluation. The matter of the IRAs and the 
matter of the Business Evaluation are two separate and distinct items and 
properly should not be considered as a single item as has been attempted by 
Mr. All red in his reply to Respondent's Motion for Relief From Judgement or 
Order. 
Fifth sentence: The signing of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Final Decree of Divorce on August 19, 1998 was performed without any 
opportunity for the Respondent to appear in person and present objections. 
<£»£ 
Second Paragraph: In connection with the September 24,1998 hearing on the 
Order to Show Cause as brought by Petitioner's Counsel, Mr. Allred, no 
consideration was given to the items for which the Respondent has filed a 
Motion for Relief. In conference the Parties to the Divorce action discussed 
the matters properly called for in the Order to Show Cause and agreements were 
entered into for those items. Respondent in no way was agreeing to a 
resolution of the three items which the Respondent seeks to resolve in the 
Motion for Relief from Judgement or Order. (On or about October 14, 1998 
Respondent terminated the services of Mr. Hunt.) 
Third paragraph: As provided in the URCP Rule 60 (b), Respondent seeks relief 
from Judgement or Orders which have a grossly adverse effect upon her life. 
Respondent is not making a separate complaint on these three items: the entire 
Divorce is a bitter complaint in which these three items are an integral part. 
First paragraph under the caption: LAW: Respondent is not an attorney. 
However, Respondent is capable of reading and understanding (analyzing) the 
written English language. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (b) plainly states 
seven (7) reasons for which a court may in the furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final judgement, or order, or 
proceeding. Reason (1): mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
Item 1 of Respondent's Motion for Relief (RMR) clearly shows that between the 
RULING and the DECREE OF DIVORCE, at least one of these four things occurred. 
Item 2 of RMR clearly shows the same thing. Thus for Items 1 and 2 of RMR it 
is clear beyond any reasonable doubt that from the writing in the documents 
themselves as evidence, the existence of the reasons for granting the RMR is 
conclusively proved. 
For RMR 3, in addition to reasons listed in (1) of URCP Rule 60 (b), Reasons 
(3) exist: note the seventeen listed items which were not included in the 
business inventory! This is at least misrepresentation, if not possible 
fraud. The Petitioner, himself, estimated his total assets as $572,000.00 as 
of November 24, 1997. After deducting the outstanding indebtedness of the 
business and the real estate value (which was awarded to the Respondent) the 
net worth of the Petitioner's business was $300,527.00. These amounts are 
based upon the exhibits which were presented during the initial hearing on May 
28,1998 in this matter. 
In the first item of the DISCUSSION section of the Allred Memorandum the 
inference is made that the Respondent failed to set forth "grounds for 
relief". This is absurd. The respondent accepted the principle that the 
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moral conduct of the Petitioner could not be put into issue but the issue of 
the suit was the equal distribution of the marital assets of the carties. That 
the distribution of the marital assets of the parties was not equal 1s clearly 
shown in RMR. The factual evidence which clearly leads to the proof of the 
unequal distribution of the marital assets is presented in the RMR along with 
other documents the Respondent has filed with the court. To wit: Financial 
statements, CPA appraisals, Bank statements, Equipment inventories, etc. 
With respect to the second item in the DISCUSSION, it is the Respondent's 
understanding that the FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and the DECREE OF 
DIVORCE are based upon the Court's RULING. The Petitioner did make complaints 
about the RULING. The Respondent's Attorney did not file objections on his 
client's behalf, and hence Respondent had to submit her own objections. 
Upon submitting the "Respondent's RESPONSE TO THE RULING" the Respondent was 
told by the Senior Clerk of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Duchesne 
County, Roosevelt, Utah, that the Court would not look at the document, at a 
later date the Respondent's Attorney said the same thing. He stated that all 
paper work had to go through the Attorney. Therefore it can be safely assumed 
that the Court did not acknowledge the Respondent's objections and hence she 
had no defense against the complaint (objections) against the RULING as filed 
by Mr. All red for the Petitioner. 
True, the court has ruled on many of the matters in this case, but the ruling 
was by one human being, not by a jury of proper selection. The judgement of 
one man is certainly not infallible. Therefore relief is properly provided 
for this possibility in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and it is well 
within the rights and privileges of the Respondent to avail herself of these 
provisions. 
In Discussion Item 3, Mr. Al1 red would like to persuade the court that the 
issues which he brought before the court in his Order to Show Cause were the 
only points of disagreement remaining between the parties. The parties did 
reach agreement on the items which Mr. All red brought before the court at that 
time. (Let it be known that the Petitioner has not as yet completed all the 
items which he agreed to accomplish within a 30 day period following the OSC 
hearing on September 24, 1998.) The three unresolved issues in the matter 
were not discussed in court nor in conference on September 24, 1998. And the 
Method for resolving these three issues chosen by the Respondent is the filing 
of a Motion for Relief of Judgement or Order as provided in the URCP Rule 60 
(b). 
Mr. Allred's statement in the fourth item of his discussion:"The court's 
decision is accurate and should not be set aside"is ro doubt in accordance 
with his view point as the legal counsel for the Petitioner. However, since 
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Mr. All red was probably the principal author of the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce he could hardly take any other view 
point. But there are two sides to this matter. The position of the 
Respondent is required tc be heard and given equal consideration with that of 
the Petitioner. Mr. Allred asserts that the court equally divided the 
retirement benefits according to its order. Now the court's position was that 
the marital assets of the parties should be equally divided, not just the 
retirement benefits. The court's Ruling stated:"The net difference in the IRA 
accounts, $14,176.00 plus $5,000.00 which is the value of a reasonable 
automobile, are awarded to the Respondent in addition." This was no doubt 
done to equalize the distribution of the marital assets. The court's Ruling 
with respect to the medical insurance for the benefit of the children was 
changed in the Decree of Divorce further disrupting the attempt in the Ruling 
to equalize the distribution of the marital assets. This change was certainly 
at least a mistake and as such 1s rectifiable under the provisions of URCP 
Rule 60 (b). 
Mr. Allred further asserts that there is no basis for the court to set aside 
the ruling on the value of the business. This assertion 1s contrary to the 
actual facts in the matter. There exist at least four separate and distinct 
estimates of the value of the business. These are estimates. Not a single one 
of the four is an absolutely true value of worth of the business beyond any 
reasonable doubt! The manner 1n which the highest and lowest estimates were 
calculated show them to be the least reliable of the four. And therefore 
should be eliminated. The middle two estimates were each calculated by 
professional experts in the financial business. At least one of these two 
estimates was calculated by a Certified Public Accountant. Since there is 
absolutely no certainty that either one of these two "middle" estimates is an 
exact value, to the nearest dollar or even one hundred dollars, and since each 
were made by assumably, equally competent professionals, then the logically 
best estimate 1s the arithmetic average of the two equally reliable estimates. 
To arbitrarily accept the lowest of the two estimates as the value of the 
business for the purposes of calculating the value of the marital assets, 
which are then to be divided equally between the two parties, is 
scientifically illogical and philosophically absurd. 
THEREFORE Mr. All red's request that the court deny Respondent's MOTION FOR 
RELIEF FROM JUDGEMENT OR ORDER 1s without any basis in fact and his request 
for the court's denial of the Motion should itself be denied. 
The Respondent hereby respectfully requests the Court to deny Mr. All red's 
request to the court that the Respondent be required to pay the attorney fees 
incurred by the Petitioner as a result of the "merit less nature of this 
MOTION since the issues involved have already been resolved by the Court". 
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The evidence herein presented is sufficient to prove the validity of 
Respondent's MOTION FOR RELIEF and thus the MOTION is not of a "merit less 
nature" as contended by Mr. Allred. Also, if the issues involved had not 
already been resolved by the Court, then there would be nc basis for a MOTION 
FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGEMENT OR ORDER. 
Respectfully, 
Bonnie K. Harlan 
Date /<3-3-7S-
tp\&\ <^V 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Bonnie K. Harlan, do hereby certify that on the _2_th day of December 1998 
I have personally hand delivered to the Clerk of the EIGHTH JUDICIAL COURT for 
Duchesne County in the City of Roosevelt, Utah a true copy of a RESPONDENT'S 
REPLY TO PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUMS OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
JUDGEMENT OR ORDER: Case No. 974000100DA. I, Bonnie K. Harlan, 
do also certify that I have this 3. day of December 1998, placed in the 
United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid copies of a Motion for Relief 
from Judgement or Order, Case No. 974000100DA addressed to the following: 
Clark B. All red, Attorney for Petitioner 
855 East 200 North (112-10) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
(^&<^' 
* . 
t V ^ 
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ADDENDUM J 
DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
DEC 101998 
JOANNE McKbttULthK 
DEPUTY RV _ ucru 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
WESLEY JOHN HARLAN, JR., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BONNIE K. HARLAN, 
Respondent. 
R U L I N G 
CaseNo:974000100DA 
The Court has reviewed the combined Motion For Relief From Judgement 
or Order, Argument Memorandum, the Petitioners Memorandum in Opposition 
and the Respondents reply. After due consideration the Respondents Motion for 
Relief From Judgement or Order is denied. The motion is denied for the reasons 
set forth in Petitioners Memorandum in Opposition. The issues have been 
evaluated and previously decided by the Court and the Court finds there is no 
compelling reason to set aside the decree. The business assets that appeared in 
the record were included by the Court. The business assets that were not 
included in the record were not. The Court did consider and evaluate all 
reasonable business assets that it could deduce from the record. The petitioner 
in this case will be awarded attorney's fees. 
Petitioner is to prepare an order and submit an affidavit of fees. 
Dated this o (r dav 
'Judge John R. Anderson 
<££% 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, to 
the following parties on the / 0 day of December, 1998. 
McKeachnie, Alired & McCiellan, P.C. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
855 East 200 North (112-10) 
Roosevelt, UT 84066 
Bonnie K. Harlan 
Respondent 
P.O. Box 513 
Roosevelt, UT 84066 
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ADDENDUM K 
PERSONAL FINANCIAL STATEMENT 
CONFIDENTIAL 
PUWTIFFS EXHIBn 
EXHIBIT «0 C? 
)ti? " 
CASINO 
OATEHICD 
WCYIOUCC . 
CUM 
TO Zions Rrst National Bank/Zons Mortgage Company, hereafter fr* "Lender* 
IMPORTANT Read theee directions before completing this statement 
If you are applying lor individual credit in your own name and are relying on your own income, or assets and not the income or assets of another person 
as the basis for repayment of the credit requested, complete Sections 1.3 «, 5, and 6. 
if you arc applying for joint credit with another person, complete aJ) Sections and provide Information in Section 2 about tne joint applicant. If appropriate 
tne mint applicant may complete a separate personal financial statement and the applications may be submitted together. 
Alimony ehlld support, or separate maintenance Income, NEED HOT BE REVEALED If you do not wish to have it ooneJCefed as a heals for repaying 
this obligation. If you ere applying for Individual credt, but are rotying in part on income from one of t r» following; alimony, child support, or separate mainte-
nance, or on the income of assets of another person as a basis far repayment of the credit r e q u e s t oompbts BU Section. Provide information In Section 
2 about the person whose alimony, support or maintenance payments or income or assets of which you are relying. 
If this statement relates to your guaranty of indebtedness ot other person(s). firm(S), or c o r p o r a t o r s ) , complete Sections 2. 3. • , 5, and 6. 
Section 1 - Individual Information 
Name Jj). "ZToyjy^ 
print) •c* ftypey pHf 
Address 
City State and Zip 
How long at Present Address? .Yrs. . Months 
Section 2 - Co-aorrowef /Guarantor (type or print) 
Name 
Address 
City. State and Zip 
How tong Mt Present Address? .Yrs. . Months 
Social Security No /Tax IP ^ > / - 4 T ^ < y / ^ P«« * Birtftf- 7 - 7 7 * Social Security No./Tex 10 Date of Birth 
Position or occupation Position or occupation 
Business Name Business Name 
Business Address Business Addn 
City, State and Zip City, State and Zip 
Length of employment Length of employment 
Res Phone Bus Phone ¥33~C <f¥ F Res Phone Bus Phone 
Nsme of Nearest Relative Name of Nearest Relative 
Address of Nearest Relative Address of Nearest Relative 
Phone of Nearest Relative ( ) iz=m 'hone of Nearest Relative ( Section 3 - Statement of Financial Condition as o f . 
ASSETS mtaUtfi LIABILITIES 
Ortojnai Monti* 
1 Con in Financial lnsi*S«« Sen 6 ££fmF2> 
H*{ M J^B— 
Notts payablt toOanti 4 Fn mat 
2.US Co«t lnuridtatoacuit iesf i * tSen.A. Out Iterator 
3 Non-ftlvKcttfil'/ftectrictetf S « -See S<s\ B Amounts aayattt to otteri-sccur a* 
< Accounts town* aid notti rtcwvtoic &$*&&& Amounts payaftfc ta atners-umceorea 
b Hell Cltl!f-$cc SUl C M e btoMftartoaoes Bayae*-SwScnjC 
5 AutarflQofks *to.<r*T& Us 
/ Other person* piupsrtjr 3g , 4 ^ P Otter unrirf tarn and Mart* 
B Cain Sur fincer v j ktt ins -Set Sot 0 Ufa hwa-snet legacy loam 
9 Loans Atctivsflic Accounts aid Ms out 
to OtNr Assets nenntf Sen. f If AppiieaftJc Oder debts (car cracti cards, tie. itenoti 
y/ZGH+lf> 
.225,7!** frrtrS. *^0 7cs: / y 
13
 / ? v & ~ ^ t*»V 4- * * ' / -ttjr+J*^ 1i>/3 
tTrtce.'*^ v - ^ 7 ^ r S . TX^ 
3% ?rr 
',?**- 'i 
I -JtO.IO 
¥?*. *-* 
/V-—» T*-*-
T«w iMftktla/MMNy Pnmnli xxjoocooum 
17 MWM11I »gnua»u 
18 TaiSjAtStM \€7o.*rro Toi^UaomtissjnoNitWerUi xxxoouooot JUUUXXXXXX 
Section S - Source of Income 
Base Salary per annum J 
Bonus and Commissions > 
Dividends anc interest Income I 
Real Estate income (Net) i 
Other Income • Itemize i 
prnnneiorshio (attach income Stmt.) 3 
Borrower Co-Borrower Section 9 - Contingent Liabilities 
Contingent Liabilities as endorsor 
Co-maker or guarantor? 
On Lease? On Contract? 
involved in pending legal actions49 
_ Other special debt or circumstances 
Contested Income Tax Uena? 
• -
YeaQ NoC 
Yes Q No Q 
YesO No Q 
YesD N o 0 
YesO NoD 
YesO NoC 
w . . t-% nm |^ 
Estimated 
Amounts 
Income from alimony, ohfld aupport or maintenance paymanu NEED NOT 
BE REVEALED. However, only tm nooma foed on this credit statamant wU 
b« considarad in determining your credit-worthlnasa. If alimony, chid support 
or maintananoe ncoma ts disclosed hero, cradit infermetfon aaneaming the 
payor may ba required to datarmina tha extent that such payments are Dcaly 
to ba eonsisfsnlfy made. 
Ara you 00119*4*4 tw pay •..*•.*.,/, 
child support or matntanance 
Type or income 
Alimony 
Child Support 
Maintenance 
Monthly Amount 
$ 
S 
$ 
Name of Payor . 
Debt to ineome. 
YeaQ N o g 
Total Contingent UabWtiet 
Are any debts paat due? ' YeaQ NoO 
Hava you ever had any auto, fumitura or other property repossessed? 
YeeD MoQ 
Have you riled Bankruptcy? YetO NoG 
Hava you applied for a loan at any Financial Institution in the last six 
months? YesQ NoQ 
If any of the above are yes. piaaae explain: 
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SECTION 4 - SCHEDULES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENT 
Humbmr of Shaft! or 
Ptee Votui of Bonds 
Schoduf A - US ao»'L ft Maffcetabfo SooUclde* 
Description In Nam* of 
Af« Theee f^«9lator«d 
Pledged/nctd by Other* 
Totai* 
Market Valuo Source gf v$iu» 
•to Una 2 taction 3 
Number at Shares 
Schedule I • Securities (NoiwJyierttetable. Restricted, Manjln Act. Controlled, 
Description in Name of 
, 
Ant Those FWgStered ~*> 
__ ^Jtdgad/haidbrOirMr^ 
, 
M - <• * . 
-Total* 
or held by B ^ ^ 
Vtiue 
»* 
Source of Value ] 
•lo flno 3 ••ettao 3 
Schedule C - Residences and Ottcf Seat tstohi Including Equlitoa (Partially or Wholly Owned) 
I Address and Type 
ol Property Title in Name of 
l o t 
Ownership 
Oate 
Acquired Coat 
Tots*-
Market 
Value 
Mortgage 
Amount 
MoiMfify 
Payment With Whom 
•to Una S section 3 
Annual 
Taxes 
Annual 
intur 
1 Name of 
| insurance Company 
Schedule D • Ufa Insurance Carried,' Ineiudlno, Group Insurance 
Owner of Policy 
Beneficiary and 
Relationship Pace Amount 
Totals' 
Policy Loana 
Cash | 
value 
•to line a section a 
I Nome and Adojcss 
of Creditor 
Original Loan 
Una Amount 
Schedule I - l e n t and Other mstftutfonaf Borrowfno* 
Date of Loan Maturity Oate 
Unsecured1 or Secured 
(Uai Coflatarai) 
Total* 
Amount Owed 
Payment , 
8chedufe ! 
•to krm 1 section 3 
Name/Add Any sua 
Vow are Part /Pnn 
Your Powtion/Tirte 
in the Business 
Schedule P - Business VerUitfce/Panucrsfcles 
Your % Ownership 
Net Worth Business 
Listed m Soetion 3 
Total Ascot* 
of Business 
Line of fiuainess 
and Years in Bus T I A 10 Number 
Firm 
Schedule G • Cash In Banks, Credit Unions, Savings ft Leone, gat. 
Branch Account Number Type 
T 
Tototj 
to bne i socaon 3 
Amount 
The information contained In the statement is provided to induce tie Lender to extend o r » continue the extension of credt to the undersigned or to osiers upon 
the guaranty of the undersigned The undersigned acknowledge and understand that tie lander k relying o n * * information provided herein n deadna to 
grant or continue crecat or to accept a guaranty thereof. Each of the undersigned represents, warrants wnd certifies that the information provided herein is true 
correct and complete. Each of the undersigned agrees to notify t » Lender immedieteiy and in wrifing of any change n name, address, or employment *nd 
of any material adverse change (1) in any of the Wormaaon eoneahcd in 4 * satament or (2) in the fnmnesaJ condition of any of t ie undcrygned or (3) in the 
acuity of any of the undersigned to perform its (or the) obfigaeoos to tie Under. In tie absence of such notice or a new and fufl written fMmenc. ft* srxxid 
be considered ms a continuing statement mnd substendaJy oomeet The Lender is authorized to make a l inhume* deemed noeessary to verify tm seeuracy 
of the mformaoon contained herein, and to determine tie eredtt-wertiiness of the undersigned. Each of t ie undersigned authorizes Tm Lender to answer ques-
tions about the Lender credit experience with the undersigned. 
Signature H n d r v i d u a n C ] * $ £ ^ U A s L » ~ Date Stoned * 2 . 4 tfiU. , 1 9 ^ 5 
Signature Co-Sorrower/Guarantor Date Signed . \% 
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TELECOPIER COVER SHEET 
DATE: Mav 15. 1998 . 
This transmission totals ( 7 ) page(s) including this cover sheet. 
TO: 
NAME: Hollis Hunt 
FIRM: 
CITY: 
TELECOPIER NO: ( 1 495-1877 
FROM: 
NAME: Jami Hogge 
DEPT: Legal Services, (801)524-4601 
FIRM: ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
Gateway Tower East - 5th Floor 
10 E. South Temple St 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
FAX NO: (801) 524-4726 
REFERENCE: Subpoena Research • Wesley John Harlan Jr. 
COMMENT: Per our conversation earlier, attached are the Financial Statements 
for Mr. Harlan. I will send the other documents to you through 
regular mail. Again, I am sorry for the delay in getting these to you. 
PLEASE NOTE: The information contained in this facsimile transmission is inttnded to be sent only lo the 
stated recipient of the transmission. If the, reader of this message is not the intended recipient or the intended 
recipient's agent, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying efthe information 
contained in this facsimile transmission is prohibited. You are further asked to notify us oftht error as soon 
as possible at the telephone number shown above and to return the facsimile documents to us immediatety by 
mail at the address shown above. Thank you for your i 
